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Studies of the Maldives and Kenya 
 
Katherine Peinhardt 
Spring 2014 
 
Abstract: This paper examines the political and social vulnerabilities of 
climate change, with the use of two salient case studies, the Republic of 
the Maldives and Kenya as exemplars of effects observed and projected. 
The susceptibilities for each nation are examined, with unique 
sensitivities highlighted and common themes synthesized between the 
two states. Examples of existing conflict, and implications of projected 
territorial conflict will be discussed. Policy outcomes will also be 
discussed for the situation of each nation, each with its own set of 
contextual sensitivities in the face of climatic shifts. Generalized policy 
options will be proposed for the common vulnerabilities between the 
two states.
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Introduction 
 
 With the imminent threats of climate change becoming clearer as they loom 
ever-closer, the vulnerabilities of nations, and the policy questions that these 
vulnerabilities raise become more apparent in the political arena. A process with the 
capacity to drastically change life processes on the surface of the Earth, climate 
change brings to the surface issues of human relocation, statelessness, and resource 
conflict. To reach these vital questions, the focus of this paper will consist in an 
evaluation and analysis of the varying vulnerabilities facing both the Republic of the 
Maldives and Kenya, two nations that exemplify different faces of the growing 
climatic shifts stemming from anthropogenic climate change, but still demonstrate 
similar underlying impacts. With the Maldives facing territorial reduction, and 
eventual insular inundation, and Kenya facing increased social conflict, especially 
regarding water, the two case studies form an expansive model for the range of 
effects that climate change has had, and is projected to have. However, both face 
damages to their vital industries, questions of resource access, and face migration 
and social issues, whether internal or external.  
 After this thorough examination of the vulnerabilities of each nation, an 
investigation into policy already undertaken or attempted, along with projected 
issues that will require political attention, such as statelessness, social conflict, and 
migration, will be examined. Potential policy outcomes, and best-case scenarios for 
legal measures will be outlined for each state’s individual context and unique set of 
climate threats.  
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 This paper will track the climate change vulnerabilities of each of these 
developing states, highlighting commonalities between the two, and examining 
policy actions taken and recommended for such vulnerabilities. Adaptation efforts 
already undertaken will be examined, along with projected policies, all with the goal 
of increasing adaptive capacity when facing climate shifts. An analysis of political 
outcomes and policy options for the two affected states will arise from the synthesis 
of such vulnerability and policy data.  
 The initial argument of this paper is that citizens of at-risk nations, especially 
those with a “developing” status, increasingly face issues of conflict related to 
resource access, and in some cases, statelessness, exacerbated by climate change 
processes. Two examples of such states are Kenya and the Maldives, which face both 
current and prospective conflicts related to human movement and resource 
allocation, respectively, all tied to climatic shifts. 
Literature Review 
 Patterns of climatic change threaten to alter the global social and political 
arena, along with geography of the modern world. Beyond the initial physical 
changes, there is a very prominent human element to these shifts. The potential 
ability of such events to bring about security issues, matters of relocation, social 
conflict, and the need for political measures to mitigate and adapt to the changes 
mean that;  “there is every reason to worry about the impacts of these changes on 
human systems given that the rate of change is unprecedented in the past 10,000 
years, and that climatic variations have triggered large-scale social disruptions in 
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the past” (Barnett 2007, 640). Knowledge of these events and their consequences 
for human life will be pivotal in the formation of policy aimed to face these effects. 
 Population Movements 
 
 Themes of migration necessitated by climatic changes are also prevalent in 
the current literature regarding the social and political effects of climate change. 
Each of these nations, still developing in their current state, has populations further 
sensitive to any fluctuation in the natural systems that support their livelihoods. 
Therefore, the issue of development status, in conjunction with climate change 
processes becomes relevant. Reuveny addresses this issue, and states; “if climate 
change causes severe environmental degradation, many people may leave affected 
areas, particularly in LDCs (Less-developed Countries), which may lead to conflict 
between migrants and residents in receiving areas. Policymakers may mitigate this 
outcome if they take initiative early on” (Reuveny 2007, 657). This prediction 
coincides with most literature on the subject; positing that the more vulnerable, 
less-developed nations will bear the majority of social relocation and upheaval. 
Less-Developed Countries, or LDCs, have lower loyalty to the borders that define 
their countries, often because they were drawn by colonizing powers, an issue that 
makes migration from affected LDCs more common.   
 Further, the issues faced by developing nations are magnified in comparison 
to those of further-developed nations; “concerns in LDCs include serious threats to 
food security and health, considerable economic decline, inundation of coastal areas, 
and degradation of land and freshwater resources”, while in DCs (Developed 
Countries), threats are “generally less extreme” (Reuveny 2007, 657). The article 
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also notes that these migrations, forced by “quick changes” of the climate and 
sudden effects on the population, are likely to increase in frequency and magnitude 
(Reuveny 2007). Some uptick in this frequency has already been noted: “in recent 
decades Asia, Africa, and Latin America have both faced the most intense 
environmental problems and depended the most on the environment for livelihood. 
We thus expect that environmental migration will be relatively more prevalent in 
these regions…Regions that exhibit more environmental problems and depend 
more heavily on the environment for livelihood also exhibit more environmental 
migration episodes.” (Reuveny 2007, 661, 662).  This may be why the most 
common type of migration-inducing environmental change included in Reuveny’s 
case studies is land degradation (Reuveny 2007, 662). This process will prove 
especially relevant to the case of the Maldives. Reuveny’s article examines a 
spectrum of environmental migration cases, in which; “19 of the 38 cases analyzed 
involved intrastate migrations, 6 cases involved interstate migrations, and 13 cases 
involved both,” with the highest numbers of migrants per event occurring in 
Bangladesh, followed by the Sahel, Brazil, the Philippines, Sudan and Somalia 
(Reuveny 2007, 662). Further, 19 of the 38 cases were of an intrastate nature, which 
leads the author to suggest that migration tensions are lessened when people move 
into an area of residents sharing their ethnicity and religion. “Environmental 
migration does not always lead to conflict, but when it does, the conflict intensity 
can be very high, including interstate and intrastate wars. In almost all the conflict 
cases, the receiving areas were underdeveloped and depended on the environment 
for livelihood. Other factors associated with conflict include resident emigrant 
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ethno-religious tension and competition over resources and resource scarcity in the 
receiving areas” (Reuveny 2007, 668). Reuveny notes Hurricane Katrina’s internal 
migration effects as a counterexample to environmental events creating migration 
conflict. In the end, the literature seems to posit that environmental problems are 
not the sole cause of migration conflict, but merely one factor that contributes. 
 Social conflict: Aggravated by Climate Change? 
 
 The concept of climate change as a conflict intensifier, or “threat multiplier,” 
alongside population size and density, is outlined as a route to environmental 
scarcity, “linked to a rise in violent conflict: environmental change, population 
growth, and unequal resource distributions” (Knight 2013, 84). Stressing relevant 
examples from South Sudan, with cattle raids exacerbated by the particular and 
demonstrated vulnerability to global temperature rises in the region, Knight’s 
article emphasizes the social conflict that corresponds with climate change acting as 
a causal mechanism, and not merely a correlative one. It also appears that natural 
disasters increase the likelihood of violent internal conflicts in the long and short 
run. Focusing on the “destabilization” of society through these incidents, the 
literature argues that states’ ability to respond often decreases in situations such as 
those brought about by climatic change (Nel 2008, 179). The ability of climate 
change to throw a society and a state’s structure into a period of rapid and 
unprecedented change is what may prove to be this “destabilizing” factor in both 
Kenya and the Maldives, though different in manner of manifestation; whether in 
pastoral social conflict or relocation of refugees/former citizens to be classified as 
stateless. 
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 Reuveny posits that certain situational factors may breed conflict, especially 
when involving matters of migration: competition, ethnic tension, distrust, fault 
lines and auxiliary conditions (Reuveny 2007). Lack of development and income 
inequality, issues prevalent in these case studies, also create an environment that 
allows for climatic processes to deepen into a larger issue. The magnitude of social 
conflict is also a factor: “The conflict intensity is classified broadly in four levels: (1) 
low, mostly unarmed, non-state violence; (2) medium, semi-organized, semi-armed, 
non-state violence; (3) high, intrastate insurgency, interstate skirmishes, or inter-
communal, armed violence; and (4) very high, intrastate or interstate war” 
(Reuveny 2007, 662).   
 Furthering the concept of climate susceptibility, Scheffran delineates the 
rules of vulnerability, while insisting that climate change exacerbation of its factors 
would be completely indirect (Scheffran 2012, 870). Other scholars, including 
Thomas Homer-Dixon, argue a direct connection between increasing environmental 
scarcity and violence. Arguing that environmental scarcity, likely to arise out of 
global climate change, often facilitates movement of a state towards a “self-
reinforcing spiral of violence, institutional dysfunction, and social fragmentation,” in 
combination with other varying state-level contextual factors, Homer-Dixon 
examines the role of environmental scarcity as a causal mechanism, interacting with 
other stability factors within a state’s sociopolitical context, in conflict creation 
(Homer-Dixon, 4-5). Thus, there exists a significant section of the literature on the 
destabilizing capacity of climatic processes, that states that many other societal 
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factors would intervene, with climate change being only a part of the spectrum of 
potentially conflict-breeding problems.  
 There is, however, an alternative standpoint in which it is stated that 
economic growth lowers the occurrence of state conflict, potentially offsetting its 
developmental contributions to climate change processes: “even if climate change 
drives conflict, the effect may not be visible if it is overshadowed by the peace-
building effect of economic development” (Gleditsch 2012, 6). This view is 
corroborated by Devitt, who also states that; “economic growth reduces the risk of 
conflict and the impact of climate change” (Devitt 2012, 130). Homer-Dixon argues, 
however, that many developing countries, a category that encompasses both the 
Republic of the Maldives and Kenya, will be susceptible to economic upset instigated 
by climate change-related disruptions of their fragile, natural resource-dependent 
economies (Homer-Dixon, 4).   
 In further contrast, some scholars hold the view that climate change-related 
weather events can cause “negative growth shocks,” which then allow the events to; 
“cause armed conflict via their negative impact on growth,” something posited by 
the literature to be more common in developing states to begin with (Bergholt 2012, 
149). Therefore, to synthesize Gleditsch and Devitt’s views with those of Bergholt; a 
nation already affected by one climatic event would become less well-equipped to 
handle any further incidences, as the former would weaken the nation’s economic 
structure and social dynamic, leaving economic development stunted and unable to 
counteract the ill effects of climate change. Barnett backs this argument, stating that; 
“the more people are dependent on climate sensitive forms of natural capital, and 
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the less they rely on economic or social forms of capital, the more at risk they are 
from climate change” (Barnett 2007, 641). Therefore, it would seem that climate 
effects have a cyclical nature; damaging, increasing vulnerability, and then 
exploiting said vulnerability and damaging yet more thoroughly.  
 In stark contrast, Gleditsch goes on to outline that there is not currently 
enough evidence to establish causal connections between climate change processes 
and conflict, providing a contrasting piece of literature on the relation between 
these two phenomena. However, this view is balanced by Homer-Dixon’s outlines of 
multiple types of conflict likely to arise out of environmental scarcity, which is 
further examined in the social conflict section regarding Kenya.  
  Research Design 
 The research question will consist of a comparison of climate vulnerabilities 
in the Republic of the Maldives and Kenya, along with an examination of the causal 
relation between climate change processes and issues of statelessness and social 
conflict. A thorough analysis of the socio-political implications of this 
anthropogenically-aggravated process will be conducted with the above two cases 
investigated. Though seemingly disparate, the cases highlight different outcomes of 
climate change effects on society, only then to link under the theme of climate 
change-induced human impacts. 
 Operational Definitions of Variables 
 The research question broaches a wide area of analysis, with the variables 
being “operationalized” in that social conflict and issues of human movement will be 
analyzed in regards to its underlying climatic factors and their ability to be tracked 
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to climate change-related environmental shifts. Based upon the aforementioned 
operational definitions of the variables involved, along with the selection for 
examination of two case studies, the nature of the research involved in this project 
will be inductive, rather than deductive. It will be quantitative in terms of the 
examination of specific and relevant geophysical shifts caused by climatic change, 
such as sea level rise projections, however, the majority of the exploration of the 
topic will be qualitative, consisting in its majority, of case analysis. Independent 
variables will be denoted as climatic changes, whether they be sea level rise or 
changes to regional hydrology or agricultural zones. These will be operationalized 
through measures of coastal erosion, sea level measurements, regional rainfall 
projections, and yearly temperature changes. Dependent variables will be social and 
political turmoil, migration from and within affected areas, and any incidences of 
statelessness resulting from the former variables. Turmoil will be operationalized as 
violent outbreaks or projections of conflict documented in my sources, migration 
through data stating that citizens have relocated within or outside of areas affected 
by climate change, and statelessness in a mostly theoretical sense; as the Maldives 
have not yet felt major external relocation of its nationals.  
 The foundations of this investigation are based on a prediction that climate 
change does, indeed, act as a causal mechanism, an aggravator or “threat multiplier,” 
for socio-political conflict and forced migration leading, in some cases, to matters of 
statelessness (Knight 2013, 84).  
 Throughout the course of this paper, the foundation of the examination of the 
Maldivian and Kenyan cases will consist in the threats multiplied by climate change, 
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or their vulnerabilities to climate. Here,  “vulnerability is an aggregate measure of 
underlying conditions,” or further, an “aggregate measure of the underlying factors 
that influence exposure” (Downing 1992). The nature of vulnerability to climate 
change varies from state to state, geophysical area to area. The conditions existing 
previous to the effects of these climatic shifts are crucial to the understanding of a 
state’s unique risk in the face of these events. A nation’s geophysical makeup, its 
population distribution, its biological norms, and its economic makeup all 
contribute to the liabilities and capabilities that a nation has working both against, 
and in favor of its capacity to adapt to climate change:  “Vulnerability can be broken 
down into three factors: (i) exposure to climate change, (ii) sensitivity to climate 
change, and (iii) adaptive capacity” (Scheffran, 870).  Heightened sensitivity to 
climate change may be offset by high levels of adaptive capacity, however, this is 
often not the case, especially in developing nations.  
 Case Study: The Maldives 
 In the first case study of the Maldives, many data from policymakers will be 
utilized; as a nation that has been politically verbal about the implications of climate 
change upon their topography, and thus their population, there is much existing 
information about the nation’s approach to both mitigation and adaptation policy. 
First to be examined, however, will be the physical shifts, brought about by climate-
related changes. These consist of the threat of inundation of the series of islands 
composing the nation within 50 years, ceteris paribus. “More than 60 percent of its 
population lives along the coast,” creating the backdrop for issues of internal 
relocation or emigration when this predicted inundation occurs. The more erosion 
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of coastlines and coral atolls that occurs along the boundaries of the island nation, 
the more vulnerable a position the Republic of the Maldives finds itself to be in 
(Karthikheyan 2010, 347).   
 In terms of policy examination for the island state, an investigation will be 
performed regarding both “soft” and “hard” legal adaptation attempts through the 
country’s creation of the ICCR, or the “Integrating Climate Change Risks into 
Resilient Island Planning in the Maldives” Program, a policy body promoting 
awareness, and physical and “institutional resilience” measures (Sovacool 2012, 
296). The particular case of the Republic of the Maldives as an exemplar for climate 
change affecting the socio-political arena of a state is appropriate for this 
investigation due to the extreme urgency of its situation, its corresponding 
international legal efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change, along with its 
being an archetype for an issue facing many different, low-lying, small island states.  
 Case Study: Kenya 
 Offering a view of a different facet of the climatic change, Kenya shows the 
more resource scarcity-driven aspect of conflict linked with these climatic shifts. 
The increasingly drought-ridden state, unstable in its agricultural yields even before 
this onset of water deficiency, has shown the impact of climatic change processes on 
its farming sector. Kenya “is facing a typical situation with conflict induced by 
environmental scarcity” (Adano 2012, 66). Conflict and movement of populations 
has occurred, made tense by the presence of small arms, especially in the northern 
regions of the nation, where a pastoral lifestyle dominates, dependent upon 
livestock and availability of pasture and water. This case is apt for the investigation 
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into social conflicts exacerbated by locally experienced shifts branching from global 
climatic changes because of its variation from the main problems faced by the 
Maldives, along with its ability to typify resource conflict.  
 Statelessness 
 An examination into the political and legal implications of statelessness, an 
issue forefront particularly in Maldivian policy, will also be conducted, though the 
case of the Maldives and many other small island states is somewhat 
unprecedented, and therefore would require that UN dealings in the matters of 
statelessness would have to be extrapolated from other causes to those of territory 
loss due to climatic changes (United Nations 1949, ix).  Based upon the statement by 
the UN, that; “everyone has the right to a nationality,” and the legal precedence that 
dictates that a state is the “sole authority responsible for determining the rules 
governing the attribution of its own nationality,” the investigation will cover these 
precedents and attempt to extrapolate them to the delicate and looming policy 
situation of nations such as the Maldives, facing a threat to their sovereignty and 
authority which would render the nation unable to grant such nationality (United 
Nations 1949, 4-5).   
 Issues with Research Design 
 Some problems that may arise within the framework of this thesis would lie 
in the establishment of causal links between climatic change and the variables of 
socio-political conflict, migration, and statelessness. Due to the fact that these 
dependent variables are; firstly, difficult to operationalize and define, and secondly, 
difficult to isolate as having one causal mechanism contributing to their frequency of 
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occurrence, the act of operationally defining these variables will be crucial. This 
definition may be something that needs to be extremely specific and technical, with 
specifications delineated as standards by which to define each outcome of climatic 
changes. This is something that will develop along with an agglomeration of 
literature and various types of source material. For example, during the peer-review 
session for the research design of this project, it was noted that there could be many 
intervening variables besides climate change, that contribute to social conflict; 
“there could be a conflict between two groups because of ethnic tensions, perceived 
injuries, etc. rather than conflict because of the stress of climate change.” For 
example, in examining the Kenya case; “the direct correlation between climatic 
shifts affecting the nation’s resource availability may be difficult to isolate: “the risk 
of increased conflict trends in Africa are likely a result of many complex reasons, 
including inadequate governance, rampant corruption, heavy dependence on 
natural resources and ongoing cycles of violent conflict” (Adano, 66).  
 Further, the ability to link Kenya and the Maldives, because of their broad 
differences, may prove more difficult than anticipated; the original design was to 
link them through underlying currents of forces of migration pushed by climate 
change. However, it may be necessary, according to Robyn Caron during the same 
peer-review session, to prove and strengthen further the relationship between 
Kenya and the Maldives. One being a land-locked nation with resource scarcity 
issues, and the other being a low-lying island nation with geographical territorial 
encroachment issues, the implications for these processes of climate change are, in 
many aspects, different. This will be accomplished through an amassment of source 
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material as well, especially regarding their rates of migration over time, their linking 
factor.  
 Further, in evaluating policy, it is very possible that one country’s approach 
to policy regarding climate change and its effects on the geography and social 
climate of their state may be extremely disparate from that of the other. For 
example, encounters with literature regarding Maldivian policy attempts to reduce 
contributions to human input to climate change on the international scale, are quite 
common, whereas Kenyan legislation is less prominent on the subject.  
 Evidence Previously Collected 
 So far, much of the literature encountered for this investigation has involved 
opinion pieces, including case studies within, as to whether climate change truly is a 
magnifying force to socio-political conflict, or whether it is a mere drop in the 
bucket of issues for each of these states, the Maldives and Kenya, which is but a 
small contribution to their socio-political and sovereign ills. Further, data has been 
gathered regarding Maldivian policy responses, yet it remains to be seen what 
Kenya has done legally to address the variables of this project. Data has been 
collected regarding the political precedence regarding statelessness, what its 
implications and historical causes are, and how the law views those deemed to be in 
such a political state.  
 What remains to be analyzed is census data depicting migration patterns for 
each of these affected states, along with documentation of any political precedence 
for a nation losing its sovereignty to supposedly “natural,” causes. Further, deeper 
insight into the nature of the conflicts already occurring in the Kenyan case study 
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would be beneficial in creating an opportunity to attempt to isolate climate change 
as an aggravating force behind said turmoil.  
Case Study Choice: The Maldives 
 A salient example of geographic vulnerability due to low elevation, the 
Republic of the Maldives is particularly susceptible to climate change damages 
because of its high population growth rate, overcrowding, overburdened 
infrastructure, and poor land planning all combine with the Maldives’ dependence 
upon foreign tourism to create a particularly threatened situation for the island 
state (Karthikheyan 2010, 344). However, it is the physical shifts, brought about by 
climate-related changes, which have been the cause of much political distress over 
the fate of the Maldives. As a low-lying state, it is threatened with inundation within 
a span of 50 years, ceteris paribus. “More than 60 percent of its population lives 
along the coast,” marking the beginning of issues of infrastructural damages, along 
with temporary internal relocation or more permanent emigration. Further, the 
coral atolls which compose much of the islands’ barrier against the sea have been 
depleted for use as building materials, and have left beaches further vulnerable to 
the erosion that has already afflicted the coastline (Karthikheyan 2010, 347).  
Decreases in freshwater access, reduction of biodiversity, especially in corals, and, 
“intensifying tropical cyclones,” are further issues that increasingly face the 
Maldives (Karthikheyan 2010, 347).  
 Case Study Choice: Kenya 
 The newly increasing drought cycle in Sub-Saharan Africa, coupled with its 
dearth of water supplies and agricultural stability, has caused fundamental changes 
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to social dynamics in many areas of the region. In particular, Kenya “is facing a 
typical situation with conflict induced by environmental scarcity” (Adano 2012, 66). 
Many areas of the nation, especially the northern border are inhibited by 
pastoralists, and are witnessing resource conflicts between said pastoralists. 
Turmoil over livestock, availability of pasture and water sources, along with the 
presence of small arms weaponry in the area have contributed to tensions. 
However, Adano notes that in this case it may not be climate change solely or 
directly affecting these changes; “the risk of increased conflict trends in Africa are 
likely a result of many complex reasons, including inadequate governance, rampant 
corruption, heavy dependence on natural resources and ongoing cycles of violent 
conflict” (Adano, 66). Further, Kenya faces the potential for increased vector-borne 
disease, such as malaria, with infections entering new regions as the weather 
patterns, temperature, and vegetative landscape change as a result of climate 
change (Downing, 14-15).  
 Thus, the issues Kenya is facing are disparate from those faced by the 
Maldives in that there is not a threat of geographical loss of national territories. 
However, each case is underscored by a vulnerability caused by dependence on 
natural resources for economic stability and development, and follows trends of 
migration prompted by climatic changes. 
 Analysis of Policy Outcomes 
 Many developed nations have increased restrictions on immigration from 
LDCs across their borders as a response to the rise in numbers requesting entry. 
However, it is predicted throughout environmental migration literature that these 
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measures will not prove sustainable in the long run (Reuveny 2007, 668). Further, 
“vulnerable LDCs could lessen their dependence on the environment for livelihood 
or protect certain areas against rising sea level” (Reuveny 2007, 669).  
 However, there first comes the issue of sensible and widespread awareness, 
preparation and mitigation. Much of the literature advises against portraying 
climate change as a necessarily conflict-inducing process, noting that this type of 
legislative reaction would be conducive to changes in perception of government 
figures and destabilizing militarization efforts (Gleditsch 2012, 7). However, to 
balance this view, many stress the necessity of education about the urgency of this 
climatic phenomenon. Both Karthikheyan and Scheffran suggest that the possibility 
of conflict must be included in creating management plans to mitigate the effects of 
climate change; “Thus, there is a need for conflict-sensitive mitigation and 
adaptation strategies that contain conflict and contribute to cooperation via 
effective institutional frameworks, conflict management, and governance 
mechanisms” (Scheffran 2012, 871). This integration into legislation is deemed 
necessary by many sources. 
 Further, recommendations regarding focus on economic growth and poverty 
elimination are included in relevant literature.  Climate change can contribute to 
both civil unrest and economic slowing, forces that can feed into each other to 
create a socially unstable state; “This means that there are two potential poverty 
traps in the model – sluggish growth leading to civil war and further slow growth; 
climate change slowing growth and enhancing vulnerability to climate change – and 
the two poverty traps may reinforce one another” (Devitt 2012, 132). Therefore, 
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measures against slowing of development are likely to create a stronger base to 
avoid this aforementioned cycle. Low-carbon growth initiatives, recommended as a 
policy option for Kenya in particular, would act as capacity-building measures, 
increasing resilience economically, while bringing awareness to climate impacts 
that often accompany development (Downing, 13).  
 The cyclical economic vulnerability view of climate change, which is 
somewhat in concordance with this “poverty trap,” needs to be avoided in the 
policies put forth by Gleditsch, who stresses climate change as a mere exacerbating 
factor to problems already present, here economic underdevelopment resulting in 
decreased adaptive capability. This aspect of policy adaptation will be examined 
over the duration of this project. Barnett also highlights certain contextual factors 
that “undermine human security” in conjunction with climate change; “poverty, the 
degree of support (or conversely discrimination) communities receive from the 
state, their access to economic opportunities, the effectiveness of decision making 
processes, and the extent of social cohesion within and surrounding vulnerable 
groups. These factors determine people and communities’ entitlements to economic 
and social capital that in turn determine their capacity to adapt to climate change so 
that the things that they value are not adversely affected” (Barnett 2007, 641). Thus, 
Barnett suggests that an improvement in these more locally focused matters would 
lessen impacts exacerbated by climatic processes.  
 Further, improvements to legal frameworks regarding stateless persons and 
environmental refugees are policy options that have been broached by much of the 
existing literature, and will be examined over the course of this project (Docherty, 
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350). Limitations to climate refugees’ status that appear in current legal 
frameworks, such as the United Nations’ Study of Statelessness, would be much 
improved by a formal convention regarding the classification and humanitarian 
provisions for these groups (Docherty, 350). This would prove particularly relevant 
to the Maldivian case, in which relocation of citizens will become a necessary action. 
 Thus, the literature holds myriad viewpoints of the nature of the causal link 
between climate processes and conflict, but with a few linking undercurrents; the 
theme of migration and tension caused therein, the theme of structural, economic, 
legal and governmental vulnerability being a magnifying factor in the impacts of 
climate change processes, along with the cyclical effects of climate on economic 
growth, and vice versa. The case studies of the Maldives and Kenya best show the 
range of matters that modern states face in the approach of ever-intensifying 
climate shifts, yet are linked in their human element due to their inclusion of the 
question of movements of people. Policy outcomes and options will be examined as 
an integral part of an evaluation of the climate contexts of both the Republic of the 
Maldives and Kenya. 
 
Discussion 
Maldivian and Kenyan Context 
 
 Many nations find themselves to be particularly vulnerable merely because 
of their elevation in relation to the sea level, such as in the Maldives. Other nations 
find themselves experiencing more frequent drought, and resource scarcity because 
of the shifting of temperatures and the change of local weather patterns, as is the 
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situation of Kenya. Instability of economic systems also contributes, magnifying the 
effects climate change has, and will have, on state actors: the Maldives’ dependence 
upon tourism, and Kenya’s long-unstable agricultural yields offer points of fissure 
that climate change processes have the capacity to quickly erode (Adano, 66). 
Climate change itself can be considered a “threat multiplier,” for both countries 
(Knight 2013, 84). Below, an examination of each state’s particular climate 
vulnerabilities will be conducted, along with an assessment of policy actions 
undertaken and recommended by and for each state. 
Vulnerabilities of the Maldives 
 
 As an island state, the Republic of the Maldives faces a unique set of problems 
as compared with continental nations. “In popular climate change discourse, islands 
are referred to as the planet’s barometers of change, litmus tests, and canaries in a 
coal mine” (Lazrus, 287). Islands will be barraged with climate-exacerbated issues 
affecting not only their topography and biology, but oftentimes their territorial 
reaches and political sovereignty. Categorical analysis of generalized “coastal area 
and Small Island vulnerabilities” reveals that the issues of coastline erosion, human 
and economic damages, and loss of tourism income are the most urgent and 
threatening vulnerabilities that exist in these areas, achieving a label of “high level of 
concern” (Leary, 14).  
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Figure 1: Vulnerabilities of the Republic of the Maldives and Kenya 
Vulnerability Maldives Kenya 
Seawater Encroachment Yes; Territorial 
inundation within 50-
100 years 
Yes; coastal areas like 
Mombasa 
Increased occurrence and 
intensity of storms 
Yes  
Infrastructural Damages Yes; crowded and 
infrastructurally 
strained coastally-
centered cities will be 
affected 
Yes; densely populated 
coastal cities like 
Mombasa, along with 
surrounding areas, will 
be affected 
Freshwater Access Yes; saltwater intrusion 
and shifts in 
precipitation patterns 
will strain resources 
Yes; pastoral conflict 
may result 
Loss of Biodiversity Yes; inundation by 
seawater will render 
territories incapable of 
supporting terrestrial 
vegetation and non-
aquatic life 
Yes; change in 
vegetative land cover 
may occur; agricultural 
capacity may change 
Vector-borne Disease  Yes; malarial infections 
will resurge in areas 
with previously low 
infection rates 
 
Reference: (Karthikheyan, 346), (Williams), (Adger, 325), (Downing, 12, 15), (Awuor, 232), (Adano, 66) 
Inundation of Territory 
 As the “flattest country on Earth,” with the highest level of vulnerability to 
sea level rise of all south Asian states, the Maldives face one of the most pressing 
outcomes of climate change in the next century (Khan, 133). Sea level changes tend 
to occur on the local scale, differing from region to region, and are determined by 
the geophysical makeup of a particular area; as seen in Figure 1, the Maldives’ flat 
surface areas are subject to sea level more than most non-island states (Khan, 135). 
The fact that the nation is so low-lying, at a mean height of only 1 meter above sea 
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level, lends itself to climatic peril, with its coasts’ geophysical integrity currently at 
risk (Karthikheyan, 346).  
 On the whole, the Republic of the Maldives has been projected to have its 
coastlines inundated with seawater within the next century; “there is a strong belief 
that the Maldives would be flooded within 50–100 years, thus leaving no trace of its 
existence” (Karthikheyan, 349). According to the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, the Maldivian capital of Male will be 85% flooded by seawater by 
the year 2100, under projected greenhouse gas emission scenarios (Khan, 135). 
Further, occurrences of “severe coastal erosion” are caused both by the 
aforementioned mounting sea levels, along with the “increase in frequency and 
intensity of extra-tropical and tropical storms” (Leary, 14). Such erosion only 
quickens the encroachment process leading to the total inundation of Maldivian 
territories. This encroachment is also aggravated by the overuse of the land along 
the shoreline existing prior to climatic shifts, and the elimination of protection that 
wetlands and now-bleaching coral reefs once provided (Leary, 14).  
 In terms of the human factors of such territorial intrusion by seawater, more 
than 60% of population lives along coastline, which implies that coastal intrusion of 
salt-water will very quickly impact human settlements in the Maldives, necessitating 
relocation (Karthikheyan, 347). With a population of over 330,000 people, the 
question of refugee status and statelessness will appear as political questions for the 
affected peoples and government of this small island republic. As the 
aforementioned eventual total inundation of the Maldives’ island territory is 
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projected as an imminent outcome of climate change processes, the question of 
universal Maldivian relocation will arise prominently in the state’s political agenda.   
Sea Level and Storms 
 Another outcome of climate change categorized as existing at a “high level of 
concern,” is the “more frequent and greater loss of life, infrastructure damage, 
displacement of population and disruption of economic activities,” all resulting 
jointly from both sea level changes and the aforementioned increase in occurrence 
and intensity of storms” (Leary, 14). Cyclones are predicted to heighten in intensity 
and damage capacity in the coming century (Adger, 326). These projections of 
storms, in conjunction with coastline encroachment by seawater and the contextual 
vulnerabilities that exist population-wise in the areas to be flooded, form the 
backbone of the human impacts of Maldivian climate change effects. Most of the 
population of the Maldives resides along the shoreline, which faces erosion and 
eventual inundation, more so with each incremental increase to the severity of 
climate change (Karthikheyan, 346). For these reasons, the human magnitude of 
effects that would occur is comparatively higher in the Maldives; “ a far greater 
proportion of the population suffers from the potential effects of a mere 1 m sea 
level rise than in larger neighbouring states” (Karthikheyan, 346).  
Economic and Infrastructural Risks 
 Further, the Maldivian economy is relatively homogeneous, and therefore 
fragile. “Tourism and leisure industries are the major source of income in Maldives,” 
forming a limited set of income-generating practices that mean that this loss of land 
over time will create economic suffering and loss of economic identity within the 
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island state (Karthikheyan, 350). This high dependence upon these economic 
systems aggravates further the damages that the island state will see inflicted upon 
the revenue generating “infrastructure, beaches, water supply and ecosystems that 
provide tourism-related services” (Leary, 14). A traditionally high population 
growth rate, especially along coastlines, have left these areas further economically 
vulnerable to inundation (Karthikheyan,  344). Damages to vital fishing industries 
may also have implications beyond the economic; resulting in a decrease in food 
security for Maldivian citizens. Coastal erosion and saline intrusion will result in 
“decreasing productivity from agriculture and artisanal fishing” (Adger, 325). 
Overall, the economic damages would be severe for island states in general, with 
estimates in the billions of USD worth of damage: “a rise of one metre, which is 
widely considered possible later this century is estimated to lead to damage of 
around $187 billion,” (Williams).  
Mid-level Risks 
 Below these aforementioned “high-level risks,” exist certain vulnerabilities 
generalized to island states that are considered to be at a “medium level of concern,” 
including; ecosystem impacts upon the fishing industry and “diminishing and less 
reliable water supply” (Leary, 15).  
Freshwater Access 
 Freshwater access is a further risk that will create harsher living conditions 
for citizens: with rainfall patterns changing in “timing and amount of rain,” 
particularly in island nations, the shifts in climatic patterns will create weather 
instability and unpredictability (Lazrus, 288). Lower latitudes are expected to 
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receive less precipitation, and the waters surrounding nations in these latitudes are 
projected to become more saline, rendering it further non-potable and less easily 
converted to freshwater (Karthikheyan, 347). It is also a pattern of island nations to 
aggravate this situation further by extracting increasing amounts of groundwater 
(Leavy, 15). The “narrow subterranean freshwater lens,” from which atoll nations 
extract their water is particularly susceptible to saltwater intrusion and 
development-related pollution (Adger, 322). “Due to coastal erosion and a reduction 
in resilience of corals, the net impact on atoll societies are likely to be increases in 
flooding events, freshwater aquifers becoming increasingly contaminated with 
saline water from storm surges and seepage,” and dependent agriculture are also 
likely to be affected by said changes to the water table, both in its composition in 
terms of salinity, and overall availability for use (Adger, 325).  
Biodiversity Loss 
 Beyond these two categories of level of concern exist additional risks, 
including the biological; “shift in species composition and competition” (Adger, 
325). This shift to climate would further affect fish species, and agriculture on this 
atoll nation, even beyond the aforementioned water access issue (Adger, 325). Coral 
atolls would suffer even beyond the impacts of sea level rise, in that other effects of 
climate change, like; “enhanced climatic variability and extreme weather events may 
in themselves constitute a ‘dangerous’ level of climate change to atoll social-
ecological systems” (Adger, 325). This change in the biological makeup of the atoll 
nation and its surrounding waters will exacerbate coastal erosion, and contribute to 
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the early stages of loss of the historic geophysical and biological identity, both in a 
figurative and territorial sense, of the Maldivian state. 
Political Actions Taken by Maldivians 
 The Republic of the Maldives entered the international environmental policy 
arena in 1989, with a conference in Male regarding sea level rise, which “recognized 
climate change and its effects as a common concern for mankind…[and resulted in 
the issuance of the] Male Declaration on Global Warming and sea level rise (SLR),” 
urging industrialized nations to aid the vulnerable small island states seeing the 
effects of global climate change in the form of said sea level rise (Khan, 134). In 
more recent years, the former Maldivian President Mohamed Nasheed has involved 
the Republic of the Maldives as one of the most active and vocal members of the 
AOSIS, or Association of Small Island States, and has worked extensively, often 
taking politically charged publicity stunts, like underwater “conferences,” to spread 
awareness of the implications of climate change on low-lying island and atoll 
nations. An audit was conducted, under his administration, gauging the output of 
carbon emissions by Maldivians, and a plan to approach carbon neutrality by 
planting mangroves, and purchasing carbon credits, was proposed by Nasheed, in 
the face of Cancún climate talks in 2010 (Williams). At these talks, compensation of 
AOSIS states was brought to the table; “the Association of Small Island States 
(AOSIS), of which the Maldives is a member, called for an enormous insurance policy 
funded by the developed nations to help these small states to pay for future damage 
from rising sea levels. The states at risk would pay a premium but payout for 
damage would largely be met by developed countries” (Williams). But, beyond 
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looking for compensation, the former President Nasheed even planned to “divert a 
part of the country’s huge tourist revenue into a very unusual fund…to buy a new, 
climate-change-friendly homeland as an insurance policy against climate change 
that threatens to turn the islanders into environmental refugees” (Economic and 
Political Weekly, 7).  
 Another measure already taken by the Maldivian government, in concerted 
efforts within the international legal arena is the; “’Integrating Climate Change Risks 
into Resilient Island Planning in the Maldives’ Program, or ICCR, a four-year $9.3 
million adaptation project supported by the Least Developed Countries Fund, 
Maldivian Government and the United Nations Development Program” (Sovacool, 
1). Focusing on “soft” physical resilience infrastructure modifications, institutional 
training for policymakers, and “strengthening of assets” at the community level to 
improve adaptive capacity (Sovacool, 1).  
Political Questions for the Maldives 
 In terms of the political ramifications of these processes; ”this is not only a 
livelihood issue for the nation; more than that, it is a problem for its sovereignty, as 
has been highlighted in 2009 by the Maldivian President’s call for finding land in 
other countries” (Karthikheyan, 350). Overall, the most pressing concern that the 
Maldives will face exists in the form of the relocation of Maldivian citizens. It is 
projected that, because of territory loss, these citizens will, under currently narrow 
definitions of refugees and stateless persons; “become de facto stateless persons if 
without having been deprived of their nationality they no longer enjoy the 
protection and assistance of their national authorities” (United Nations, 8). This 
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political ramification will occur for climatic reasons, with citizens becoming 
deprived of their homeland, and thus their nationality, through such an 
unprecedented manner within the realm of nationality and statelessness. Citizens 
will likely become formally stateless, that is, without intervention in regards to 
current international law surrounding displaced persons; an overall “absence of 
general rules for the attribution of nationality and the discrepancies between the 
various national legislations constitute the permanent source of statelessness” 
(United Nations, 4).  These stateless former Maldivian citizens would likely be 
“obliged to live outside the law,” due to the inevitable uncertainties regarding their 
legal statuses, vulnerable in that they have “no clearly defined rights” (United 
Nations, 9). 
 This gradual loss of territory, resulting in complete insular inundation, will 
necessitate an organized and strategic re-settlement of Maldivians within the 
territories of other states.  The paths of the International Refugee Organization, 
which generally consist of repatriation or re-settlement of refugees under its care, 
are limited in this case, as repatriation options will be rendered impossible due to 
the inundation of the entire Maldivian territory (United Nations, 5). Thus, 
Maldivians will face inadequate international legal frameworks for the 
acknowledgment of their citizenship, as climate refugees are often neglected in this 
respect within modern international law.  
 Policy recommendations regarding statelessness and refugee status have 
often focused upon the creation of an independent convention on the status of 
climate refugees. Such a title for displaced peoples is a relatively new concept, with 
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an inadequate existing legal framework to address the problems of relocation and 
citizenship outcomes (Docherty, 350). With guarantees of human rights during the 
process of displacement and relocation, along with provisions for institutions to 
uphold such guarantees, a convention could assure that climate refugees do not 
continue to fall between the gap that exists between the Refugee Convention and the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Involvement of 
community-level groups and “civil society” would be advisable, especially for the 
Maldivian case, in order to expedite negotiations and further ensure humanitarian 
provisions (Docherty, 350). Further, advocacy for the recognition of a formal status 
of such affected people as environmental or climate refugees under international 
law has been proposed, especially by the industrialized nations that have 
contributed to climate impacts, thus taking part in a long-term and neglectful  
“environmental persecution” that led the soon-to-be refugees to such a fate 
(Economic and Political Weekly, 7).  
 As a more local political measure for the Maldives, Karthikheyan suggests 
that the; “Maldives still has the difficult task of sensitising the global community 
about the environmental problem surrounding it, and to alleviate its existential 
threat. Maldives also faces the challenge of successfully integrating these 
environmental concerns into their national policies and programmes. The successful 
implementation of a viable environmental policy resides in the ability of Maldives to 
garner international support both in terms of financial and technical assistance” 
(Karthikheyan 2010, 350).  
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 There exist certain policies that have proved useful for atolls in adapting to 
environmental upheavals throughout history; resilience through “traditional 
knowledge, institutions and technologies; opportunities for migration and 
subsequent remittances, land tenure regimes; the subsistence economy; and 
linkages between formal state and customary decision-making processes” (Adger, 
328). However, these processes are arguably undermined by integration of atoll 
nations into the global economy, through exploitation of their Economic Processing 
Zones and tourism sectors (Adger, 329).  
 Vulnerabilities of Kenya 
 As a rule: “Africa is predicted to have greater impacts than other world 
regions, because of higher vulnerability and lower adaptive capacity. Impacts could 
threaten past development gains and constrain future economic progress. Some 
regions and populations in Kenya have very high vulnerability” (Downing, ii). The 
economic context of Kenya, along with its geographical and physical makeup, make 
it particularly vulnerable to the risks of sea level rise, agricultural loss and economic 
damages, resource access problems, and social conflict. 
 Sea Level Rise: Coastal Encroachment 
 Kenya, as another state bordered by ocean, also faces coastal encroachment 
of seawater as a result of sea level rises. Cities like Mombasa, a vital port city with a 
highly concentrated population, lie along this coastline. Mombasa is the second-
largest city in Kenya, after Nairobi, and as the “largest international seaport in 
Eastern Africa,” plays a vital role as a commercial and tourism hub, along with that 
of a population center (Downing, 12). Mombasa and surrounding towns are also 
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low-lying areas, with “significant population and infrastructure, and are home to 
tourism, aquaculture and agriculture” (Downing, 12). Mombasa is projected to 
continue with population growth, and for this reason, increase its exposure, both in 
its human and infrastructural elements, to the risks of sea level rises (Downing, 12). 
 Overall, in Kenya; “coastal flooding from sea level rise is estimated to affect 
10,000 to 86,000 people a year by 2030,” along with a rise in “wetland loss and 
coastal erosion…[with] economic costs in 2030 estimated to be $7 to 58 million per 
year, including flooding” (Downing, iii). These economic damages are also predicted 
to increase over time. Damage costs would; “by 2050…increase to $31 - 313 million 
per year and would increase further in future years through to 2100…without 
adaptation, the physical, human and economic impacts will be significant” 
(Downing, 11).  
 Agro-biological Losses and Tourism Damages 
 In terms of economic damages, disruption of the already fragile agricultural 
system would be at the forefront of issues: “Food security and general economic 
performance is … very low; the latest available figures (from 1997) show that 38.2 
per cent of the population face absolute poverty and 38.6 per cent face food 
poverty” (Awuor, 232). This context places Kenya in a state of vulnerability to 
changing weather patterns that have bearing over crop productivity. As a “top 
earner of foreign exchange,” the agricultural sector is also a cornerstone to the 
tenuous Kenyan economy (Downing, 23). The majority of Kenya’s population is still 
classified as rural, despite rural-to-urban movement trends, and livestock 
production is an essential part of the lifestyles of populations in the arid and semi-
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arid regions of the country (Downing, 23). It has been noted, that “weather-related 
hazards already present a serious threat to agriculture. These will be potentially 
exacerbated by a mix of climate and socio-economic change” (Downing, 23). 
Projections of complex agricultural impacts have been made, with some positive, 
such as CO2 fertilization, and some negative effects, like increased summertime 
temperatures decreasing crop yields. For Kenya, “increased winter temperatures 
are associated with higher crop revenue, increased summer temperatures have a 
negative impact and increased precipitation was positively correlated with net crop 
yield” (Downing, 23). Overall, these mixed patterns, affecting different landscapes 
with varying outcomes, show significant and complex impacts on agriculture, with 
“differences [in effects on yield] with potential zones, predicting a 1% gain in high 
potential zones but a 22% loss in medium and low potential zones” (Downing, 24). 
Some highlands may see increased crop yields, however, these benefits would be 
offset by significant shifts in evapo-transpiration and rainfall processes, leading to 
land cover changes in other areas (Downing, 24). This relatively conflicting 
projection for Kenya, with its diverse landscapes, leaves significant shifts in 
agricultural production on the projected timeline. At the very least, adaptation 
efforts will be necessary in response to both the positive and negative crop impacts.  
 Overall ecosystem stresses are already reported in Kenya, affecting water 
supply, biodiversity, food provision, and energy resources. These natural processes 
are projected to shift, affecting nature-based economic activity even beyond farming 
practices; “In addition to agriculture, nature-based tourism, fishing, timber and 
charcoal production are other important sources of income in the country” 
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(Downing, 25). These ecosystem services, as well as provision of raw materials, will 
be put under significant strain, and the climate shifts at fault will only add to the 
pressures already undergone by these systems. 
 Tourism is a pillar of the Kenyan economy, especially in coastal cities like 
Mombasa, and damages to the shoreline and the ecosystem attractions in their 
general vicinity will prove devastating to this industry (Awuor, 232-233). The main 
factors of coastal Mombasa’s vulnerability to climatic shifts consist in its geophysical 
makeup, much like the Maldives’ vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities include: “low 
altitude, and high temperatures and humidity levels. Regarding the first of these, 
Mombasa is on the coastal plain…parts of the city and its surroundings are likely to 
be submerged with a rise in sea level, and this would consequently disrupt 
ecosystem functions and balance, disrupt agricultural and industrial activities, cause 
the destruction of human settlements and interfere with the water supply” (Awuor, 
233). In one city alone, albeit one particularly vulnerable to the oceanic effects of 
climate change, the spectrum of damages brought about by climate change can be 
seen, and many extrapolated to other regions of Kenya. 
 Disease 
 Many regions of Kenya have been, until the effects of climate change, 
protected from certain temperature-sensitive diseases by their highland landscapes. 
However, with warming in Kenya projected to be significant, malaria is also 
predicted to increase its effects upon the vulnerable populations of Kenya. “The 
model projects that by 2055, as a result of the central average climate warming 
(2.3ºC) across the projections, the population annually affected by malaria in rural 
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areas over 1000 metres (which comprises 63.5% of the population of Kenya) would 
increase by up to 74% (in absence of adaptation)” (Downing, 15). This increase in 
disease occurrence is projected to bring economic costs of over $86 million in the 
2050s, in addition to Kenya’s present malarial burden. These projections also do not 
account for co-prevalence with HIV/AIDS infections, which could enhance the 
economic damages (Downing, 16).  
 Resource Access 
 In the more northern, arid regions of Kenya, the main issue that has arisen 
due to temperature changes and meteorological pattern shifts is resource access; 
“the changes in rainfall patterns and frequent droughts make the survivability of 
pastoralists in the arid environments particularly difficult. Cyclical droughts are 
increasing in frequency, with the drought cycle, on average, increasing” (Adano, 66).  
 Creating an ambient of inherent vulnerability, which climate change appears 
to magnify, are certain conditions that Kenya is enduring as a nation still striving for 
development. Kenya; “is experiencing the drying up of lakes and rivers, dwindling 
water supplies, and serious food shortages” (Adano, 66). Each of these climate-
dependent processes determines the distribution of resources, of fresh water 
uncontaminated by intruding seawater, and of agriculture dependent upon 
temperature stability along with the aforementioned fresh water. However, there 
appears a paradox in terms of the agricultural effects of climate change yet to take 
full effect in this sub-Saharan state; “National food production potential in Kenya 
may well increase with increased temperature and precipitation. However, the 
impact of climate changes on productivity and vulnerable socioeconomic groups in 
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the semi-arid areas could be devastating. For pastoralists and farmers, reductions in 
the area suitable for cultivation in the order of 15 to 30 per cent in the sub-humid 
and semi-arid provinces significantly increases the number of people with 
inadequate climatic resources for sustainable agriculture” (Downing 1992). This 
projected increase in unusable land for pastoralist groups may prove both socially 
and politically harmful in the long run, which will be examined in the next section. 
 Social Conflict 
  As a developing country, Kenya is projected in the high-risk category for 
environmental scarcity-related social conflict stemming from climatic change in the 
region. Most developing nations, as they are highly economically dependent upon 
natural resources and have fewer adaptive resources to “buffer themselves from the 
effects of environmental scarcities” (Homer-Dixon, 4). The potential for conflict 
between “urban and rural dwellers or between nomads and sedentary farmers” is 
high as food-crop production systems are put under climatic strain. 
Environmentally-induced social conflict generally appears in one of five forms: 
“disputes arising directly from local environmental degradation…ethnic clashes 
from population migration…civil strife caused by environmental scarcity…scarcity-
induced interstate war…[and] North-South conflict between developed and 
developing worlds over mitigation and adaptation” (Homer-Dixon 5). In the case of 
Kenya, many predict an appearance of social conflict in the form of civil friction over 
scarce resources.  
 Stresses on land use and distribution, in combination with growing 
populations dependent upon such divided agricultural production sectors may 
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exacerbate tensions within states (Homer-Dixon, 3). The main occurrences in Kenya 
of conflict that has been, and is projected to be, affected negatively by climate 
change processes, have been related to such nomadic pastoralist lifestyles. The 
aggravation of water resource access, and of the agricultural systems and practical 
norms throughout, primarily, the arid North of Kenya, has created incidence of 
social conflict. “In the Sahel, in Kenya, changing rainfall patterns have the potential 
to increase resource scarcity as a driver of pastoral conflict” (Scheffran, 870). This 
social conflict coincides directly with the vulnerabilities of water and land resource 
access, along with agricultural system stability.  
 Generally, the patterns of rainfall determine the patterns of movement of 
pastoralist groups, a prevalent lifestyle in arid and semi-arid areas of Kenya. The use 
of distinct grazing areas is determined by such meteorological events, and 
community relations are dictated by decisions as to this matter. “The availability of 
common-pool resources across border areas leads to periodic conflicts in the 
drylands. Conflicts between pastoral communities in the arid border- lands of 
northern Kenya, southern Sudan and southern Ethiopia are said to be over access to 
pasture and water, livestock raiding and the heavy presence of small arms” (Adano, 
66). Thus, water availability conditions are already strained, with conflicts emerging 
in pastoral groups over the resource; shifts in weather patterns and temperature 
that are projected to come will likely only aggravate this context. As a pattern in 
sub-Saharan Africa, “a one percentage point decrease in rainfall raises the likelihood 
of a country experiencing conflict incidence by about two percentage points and 
conflict onset by three percentage points” (Bergholt, 149). Therefore, the 
 38
aforementioned predicted upheaval of rainfall patterns, and change in vegetative 
ground cover, along with an increasingly harsh drought cycle will heighten such 
resource-related tensions, and likely the frequency of social conflict. 
 The particular vulnerabilities mentioned above make Kenya an area 
particularly vulnerable to further conflict. “Food insecurity has been found to 
contribute to violence, as exemplified by recent “food riots” but there is little 
empirical evidence that climate variability is an important driver of violent land-use 
conflicts.” However, in Kenya, pastoral conflict may be driven by resource scarcity 
increased by changes to rainfall (Scheffran, 870).  
 Policy undertaken in Kenya 
 A National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP) has been created in Kenya, 
which consists of proposed adaptive measures by the Kenyan government in 
response and preparation to climate change. Multiple climate vulnerability 
assessments are recommended, in sectors like transportation, along with 
integration of climate resilience measures into its operations and plans for 
infrastructure, such as “climate-resilient materials and designs” (Republic of Kenya, 
3). The modification of rural electrification programs, to account for increasing 
climate variability, financing of low-cost, efficient energy sources for citizens, and 
energy source diversification (much of which will be aimed toward renewable 
energy sources) are energy-sector measures proposed in the NCCAP. Meteorological 
alert systems spread at the community level, as well as community involvement in 
land use deliberations (Republic of Kenya, 20). Funding for the National Council for 
Science and Technology, in order to incentivize cross-discipline research regarding 
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climate adaptations, and to disseminate it nationally, has also been suggested in the 
Plan. The creation of an environment conducive to “low-carbon and climate 
resilience investments and technologies,” as well as to the equitable distribution of 
land through “efficient implementation” of the Kenyan National Land Use Policy 
(Republic of Kenya, 37). This measure may address pastoralist conflicts, in that it 
manages land use for Kenyan citizens, a source of resource contention as mentioned 
above. The addressing of population movements, likely motivated by resource 
availability shifts due to changes in weather patterns is occurring with a; “regional, 
holistic approach to migration as an adjustment or coping mechanism in the face of 
current climate variability and climate change, working in close collaboration with 
other national governments in East Africa and international organizations” 
(Republic of Kenya, 35). In planning for regional, inter-state collaboration, Kenya’s 
plan leaves room for international agreements regarding any potential refugees 
from the changing landscape and climate of Kenya. Awareness and research 
programs have been proposed in the action plan, in each of the sectors mentioned 
above.  
 Adaptive Policy in Kenya 
 Four main adaptation policies have been outlined for Kenya’s particular case, 
the first two of them considered “development activities,” and the third and fourth 
policies associated with climate risk management: “Accelerating development to 
cope with existing impacts, increasing social protection, building adaptive capacity 
and institutional strengthening, and enhancing climate resilience” (Downing, v). The 
first category of development acceleration deals with questions like “integrated 
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water management, electricity sector diversity, natural resources and 
environmental management,” aimed toward preventative progress in the face of 
climate change. The policy of increasing of social protection promotes “cash 
transfers to the most vulnerable following disasters, [and] safety nets for the most 
vulnerable,” in order to increase societal resilience (Downing, v). The climate risk 
management efforts begin with adaptive capacity-building policy; this includes 
improvements to meteorological monitoring, along with education. Resilience 
improvement efforts include the more physical measures such as infrastructure 
modification and flood prevention measures, adaptive efforts to ease the impending 
burdens of extreme climate change weather events and sea level rise.  
 The aforementioned policy adaptations are projected to be extremely 
productive in terms of adapting to climate effects like rising sea levels; it is 
predicted that early adaptation will significantly lessen economic damages, 
especially in coastal areas, along with the numbers of people affected by coastal 
flooding (Downing, vii). Low-carbon growth has also arisen as a recommended 
policy focus for Kenya, with adaptive investment plans and regional collaboration 
allowing advantages through increased economies of scale, marking Kenya as an 
“early mover” in this field of development (Downing, 13).  
 Considerations have been made in Kenya for infrastructural management of 
the effects of climate change, specifically phenomena like flooding; 
recommendations for improved drainage facilities have been made throughout 
literature regarding potential policy routes for Kenya. Measures like; “coastal 
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defences; realignment of coastal defences landwards; abandonment (managed or 
unmanaged); measures to reduce the energy of near-shore waves and 
currents; coastal morphological management; and resilience-building strategies,” 
have been surveyed as options for coastline adaptations (Downing, 33). Further, the 
encouragement of settling in “peri-urban” spaces away from the shoreline is another 
route, a specific charge that Kenya’s local and national government may choose to 
take in facing Mombasa and other coastal cities’ unique risks (Awuor, 240). Flood 
risk mapping as a preventative and informative measure has also been projected as 
a necessary policy option. These policies must be integrated into development plans 
in order to maintain the integrity of coastal and floodplain areas (Downing, 40).  
 Further, land planning practices, especially regarding residential settlements, 
that would benefit Kenya through reduced water-borne disease and lowered risk of 
flooding, have been proposed.  In terms of other disease adaptations, Malaria Early 
Warning Systems, or MEWS, monitor environmental conditions with regard to the 
fostering of malaria outbreaks, while pregnant women are focused on for early 
treatment. “Increasing support for all pregnant women in low endemic and 
epidemic areas to be targeted” with medication twice during pregnancy to alleviate 
the adverse symptoms of malaria has been implemented as national policy 
(Downing, 37). Further, it appears that initiatives such as continuation and 
enhancement of this treatment practice, along with rapid diagnosis tests, are highly 
cost-effective policy routes that Kenya will likely take, in the face of increased 
malarial infection (Downing, 38). Such reactionary measures to the spread of 
malaria  
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 “Increasing water demands,” could be addressed by the government through 
improvement of sanitation facilities and irrigation networks, a preventative 
measure that would help to avoid groundwater over-exploitation, along with 
saltwater intrusion (Awuor, 240). Evident as water policy options are both; 
demand-side management, which consists in irrigation improvements and end-use 
efficiency measures, along with supply-side management, to mitigate over-use and 
allocate for agriculture and pastoral use of water. Ecosystem management to reduce 
siltation and erosion is also a projected adaptation measure to be implemented in 
conjunction with the previous water policy measures (Downing, 42).  
 In the agricultural sector, various strategies for adaptation have been 
proposed for Kenya’s particular vulnerabilities: a community-based approach to the 
stabilization of now-fragile agricultural systems, utilization of climate warning and 
information systems, agricultural research and extension services, provision of 
micro-finance, development of the national market, and food supply chain 
regulation with pest control. Based on capacity-building, and “anticipatory 
adaptation,” these strategies enhance climate resilience on a community-by-
community basis (Downing, 44-45). To further prevent economic damages to the 
natural resource-based economy of Kenya, ecosystem adaptation policies have been 
proposed as well: increase of land classified as reserve, establishment of buffer 
zones around such reserves, wildlife corridors to increase continuity of a particular 
landscape, translocation or reintroduction of species to affected areas, reforestation, 
ex situ species conservation, and improvements to inter-regional collaboration and 
research regarding ecosystems’ responses to climatic shifts (Downing, 47).  
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 However, it would appear that such changes, proposed initially for Mombasa 
in particular, will meet roadblocks that seem inherent to sub-Saharan states’ 
economic instability; one of their key vulnerabilities. This cyclical nature of 
economic and technological limitations leading to decreased preparedness, may 
prove further damaging in that Kenya will see itself with fewer adaptive and 
mitigating policy options. “For Africa, low adaptive capacity results largely from the 
limited financial, technological, and institutional capacity, relatively low levels of 
economic development and high levels of poverty widely experienced in the 
continent. Increased climate change threatens to undo decades of development and 
poverty reduction efforts so far achieved in most countries” (Awuor, 231). However, 
measures like; “encouraging pilot actions to test promising responses” to climate 
shifts, and a focus on short-term, low-cost measures, which could arise from such a 
context, are seen as effective measures in adaptation (Downing, 32).  
 Preparedness and education initiatives for the general public regarding risks, 
especially those preemptive to natural disasters aggravated by climate change, are 
being proposed by many, to be undertaken by juxtaposing the work of local 
government and meteorological and maritime strategists (Awuor, 241).  
Analysis 
 Overall, these two developing nations demonstrate high levels of climatic 
vulnerability typical of less-developed states, and are projected to suffer particular 
susceptibilities with limited adaptive capacity due to their developing status. Their 
typical developing reliance upon nature-based tourism, and raw natural resources 
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for economic stability is what will undermine them as climate shifts disrupt such 
economic activity.  
 Between the two examined states, a wide range of climate vulnerabilities 
appear, with the Maldives facing insular inundation, more intense storms and rising 
sea levels, economic/tourism and infrastructural damage, water access changes, and 
loss of biodiversity. Kenya, in the meanwhile, is projected to suffer from sea level 
rises/coastal seawater intrusion, agro-biological shifts, losses to tourism, increase in 
infection of diseases like malaria, resource access, and social conflict.  
 These two states visibly overlap in many of these key areas of exposure to 
climate change processes; namely sea level risks, economic/tourism/infrastructural 
damages, biological losses, and changes to access by populations to resources like 
fresh water.  
 While these states are limited in their financial resources in terms of 
capacity-building, there are some policy options that can be generalized to their 
situations, in terms of adapting to this anthropogenically-fueled climatic crisis. 
 Generalized Policy Options 
 The vulnerabilities of both the Maldives and Kenya to climate change, defined 
by Downing in terms of exposure of a population, leave both states in need of 
further contingency planning, even if such vulnerabilities affect populations in an 
indirect manner, as posited by Scheffran in the Literature Review. Homer-Dixon 
argues that proactive interventions, “ a broad and integrated set of responses at the 
international, regional, national and community levels,” will be necessary to avoid 
deeply entrenched social violence, in the context of environmental scarcity. This 
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scarcity, likely to arise in both the Maldives and Kenya, can be spearheaded through 
policy intervention, breaking the “early links in the causal chain” that leads toward 
social conflict. An avoidance of the use of conventional military institutions, proven 
to be generally ineffective in dealing with these violent outcomes, through this 
proactive approach, would be commendable (Homer-Dixon, 10).  
 Kenya also maintains a focus, in its plans for climate action, on community 
involvement, and reliance on customary institutions and traditional knowledge and 
networks in order to implement conflict resolution systems and adaptation 
measures (Republic of Kenya, 35). This is a strategy that would benefit both states, 
in that it would promote internal awareness and collaboration, and foster a policy 
arena conducive to the necessary environmental considerations. 
 Further, both states have addressed, or begun to address migration issues. As 
noted in Reuveny’s works in the Literature Review, states must take a proactive 
stance on spearheading this issue of population movements in order to reduce the 
likelihood of social strife. The destabilizing effects of climate-induced migration, 
mentioned by Nel, will be better handled if negotiated ahead of the movement of 
such climate refugees. While the Maldives have specifically sought out areas for 
relocation of citizens, diverting funds into land purchases for citizen relocation, as 
mentioned above. Through Resilient Island Planning efforts, the Maldives also plan 
for soft infrastructural modifications, in order to adapt its population’s inhabitation 
of a more limited land mass. Kenya has also addressed potential population 
movements, likely to be motivated by resource availability shifts due to changes in 
weather patterns, with plans for a; “regional, holistic approach to migration as an 
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adjustment or coping mechanism in the face of current climate variability and 
climate change, working in close collaboration with other national governments in 
East Africa and international organizations” (Republic of Kenya, 35).  
 Overall, however, it is through an acknowledgement of current international 
law limitations, as noted in the Literature Review’s examination of United Nations 
documents regarding refugees and stateless persons, that these two states would 
ensure the provision of assistance to its citizens as climate change alters their 
livelihoods and may push them to relocate. Modifications to the International 
Refugee Organization, the Refugee Convention and the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, in conjunction with community-level involvement, 
would ensure provisions for affected peoples facing climatic turmoil within their 
own states.  
 Capacity-building and proactive adaptation measures, such as provision of 
micro-finance and agricultural extension services, as well as funding of research for 
low-carbon development and climate resilience technologies are another general 
area in which these states should focus their budgets, as well as any aid provided to 
them by industrialized nations. The fostering of an aware and adaptive population is 
a socio-political measure that will branch into all areas of resilience improvements. 
 Overall, developing states, such as Kenya and the Republic of the Maldives, 
find themselves in a uniquely strained situation within the impending era of man-
made climate change. Their economic fragility and dependence upon their 
geophysical resources for stability render them comparatively unprepared to adapt 
to climate change processes, when examined in the shadow of further-industrialized 
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states. However, the aforementioned policy strategies, some already undertaken, 
and others yet to be implemented, are best taken proactively and spread across the 
gap between the international and local community levels.  
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